The US started a war with Iraq but Iran may have already won it. Although the news this week in Washington is centered on the troop "surge" in Iraq, Iran remains perhaps an equally complex and difficult policy issue for the Bush administration. In 2001, notwithstanding Iran’s mutual interest with the US in removing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the Al Qaeda-sponsored terrorist attacks of September 11, and its initial support for the US war there, Washington missed an opportunity to build the relationship. The Bush administration believed Iran was weak, threatened with democratic reform movements and despite, its initial intelligence and logistical support in countering Al Qaeda, tied to Middle Eastern terrorism. It did not help that administration rhetoric has often ranged from clumsy to belligerent. In 2002, Bush administration hardliners placed Iran in its tripartite "axis of evil" (with Iraq and North Korea) and viewed it as the next target after Iraq. The invasion of Iraq, which Iran opposed, and the toppling of the government, removed its foremost regional enemy while tying down its Western nemesis in an unwinnable war. At the same time it had the effect sharpening the antagonism with the US. MORE...

Map: Complements of Alernet

As we approach the end of 2006, there is no end in sight for the catastrophically unnecessary war the US has unleashed in Iraq. For the past three years this nation of 28 million people has experienced a headlong descent into a state of chaos. Robert Matthhews examines the chaotic situation in the country --which could intensifies after Saddam's execution-- and analyses the posibilities for political change under the new Democrat-dominated Congress.

Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's assertion that Israel will not negotiate with a Hamas-led Palestinian Authority is a red herring. The truth is that for the last two years, Israel has not been negotiating with the existing Palestinian Authority anyway. This is the starting point of this interesting analysis on the possibilities of peace in the region after the victory of Hamas and Kadima.

The journal Papeles de Cuestiones Internacionales presents a new issue, which includes a special dossier on the Euromediterranean partnership, coordinated by Professor Bichara Khader. It includes analyses by:

· Bichara Khader, on "Euro-Mediterranean Association or Euro-Arab Association"

· Neila Akrimi, on the "Policy of Neighborhood: The Reaches and Limits of a Strategy"

· Isaías Barreñada and Iván Martín, on "Civil Society and the Euro-Mediterranean Association: From Rhetoric to Practice".

· Gemma Aubarrell and Marta Rovira, on "The Barcelona Process ten years later".

For more information and acquisitions, send an e-mail to: publicaciones@fuhem.es

The Euromediterranean dialogue advances with difficulties and limited results. The Barcelona Summit +10 in November 2005 focused in the priority issued for the EU: terrorism and immigration. The Peace Research Center (CIP-FUHEM) held, prior to the Euromediterranean Summit, a working meeting of which we offer the main conclusion. Bichara Khader, director of the Center of Studies on the Contemporary Arab World in the University of Lovaine (Belgium), took part in the working meeting, where he discussed the main issues of the Euromediterranean Partnership.

In 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was signed in Barcelona. Today, ten years later, it still cannot sustain flight. This is the main argument presented by Bichara Khader in this analysis. Professor Khader defends that the European Union should strengthen their ties with the Arab countries and promote their integration, which in turn would bring stability to the South shore.

The Barcelona Process was initiated with the objective to create a peace zone of prosperity and stability shared by the south shore of the Mediterranean. Ten years later the international context had changed radically. The threat linked to the international terrorist networks had placed the security agenda above all other concerns. On the eve of the 10th celebration of the Barcelona Process, the evaluations of the results achieved affirmed the numerous weaknesses of the policies and strategies conceived by Europe in this framework as well as the meager effects produced in the societies on the south shore of the Mediterranean.